THE STRICT DETERMINATENESS OF CERTAIN INFINITE GAMES
PHILIP WOLFE 1. Introduction* Gale and Stewart [1] hav6 discussed an infinite two-person game in extensive form which is the generalization of a game as defined by Kuhn [3] obtained by deleting the requirement of finiteness of the game tree and regarding as plays all unicursal paths of maximal length originating in the distinguished vertex x 0 . In a winlose game the set S of all plays is divided into two sets S τ and• S ΣI such that player / wins the play s if seS r and player // wins it if seS ir . Gale As in [1] , Vi(x) is the set of all plays passing through x (the topology for S is that in which U(x) is a neighborhood of each play in it). Then for each n f and since for any yeX we have We assume hereafter that Γ is a GS game with S r described in terms of Y^X as in §2, and that whence by Lemma 1. The strict determinateness of Γ will follow from Lemma 1 and the fact that proved in §4. LEMMA so that either Xι<^%2<^x i or x^<Cxι<^x όy which is impossible in view of the restriction imposed upon σ, in obtaining σ x .
Since the domains of the a' x cover XJ and are disjoint, they have a common extension ^*, which necessarily maps the elements of X τ f on their immediate successors, and thus belongs to Σi(^V)
We show that σ* wins Γ τ . Let For this r and any x in Y', let i(x) be the least i such that <^, τ>(i whose existence is given by Lemma 3. Define {x n } inductively bŷ Reversing the roles of the players in the above gives the result that a GS game is strictly determined if S £ is an F σ .
The strict determinateness of a two-person zero-sum game with G payoff having chance moves can be shown. The proof is more complicated, but uses the same ideas [4].
5. An application* Let Γ = (x ΰ9 X 19 X τl9 X 9 f 9 S f Φ) 846 P. WOLFE be a zero-sum two-person infinite game of perfect information with no chance moves having payoff Φ such that there exists a real function h on X {\h{x)\<K<oo) with 0(s)=lim &vφh{s(i)) for all seS .
Γ is the result of an attempt to reduce the following situation to a game: The tree K of a GS game and a function h as above are given the two players make choices in K in the belief that every play will terminate in some unknown, but distant, vertex x, at which time player / will receive the amount h{x) from player 27. A payoff function Φ is sought such that Φ{s) (-Φ(s) ) expresses the utility to player / (II) of a play s in K.
The payoff Φ defined above arises from ascription to players I and II respectively of " optimistic " and " pessimistic " behaviors in this way : Player / assumes that the play s will terminate in some " distant" vertex s(i) at which h assumes nearly its supremum on all " distant" vertices of s; he thus makes his choices so as to maximize the expression
lim sup h(s(i))=Φ(s)
and player // supposes that s will terminate in some " distant" vertex at which his gain -h(s(i)) assumes nearly its infimum for all such vertices, and thus seeks to maximize lim inf -A(s(i))= -Φ(s) , ithat is, to minimize Φ. The derived game is thus zero-sum. Ascription, however, of such " optimistic " or " pessimistic " payoffs to both players yields, in general, a non-zero sum game.
We show now that the game Γ of this section is strictly determined, using the method of Theorem 15 of [1] which asserts the strict determinateness of Γ for the more special case of continuous Φ. (Gillette [2] has shown the strict determinateness of an infinite game of perfect information with chance moves which consists in repeated play from a finite set of finite games and has payoff 
